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Iraq: The Challenge 
of Nonstate Actors
By FAAisA RAshid
Introduction
There are few regions in the world that can parallel the history of Iraq. Often 
referred to as the cradle of civilization, Iraq is the place of compilation of the Babylo-
nian Talmud that defines traditional Judaism, the homeland of Abraham in the Bible, 
and the capital of the Islamic civilization from 8th—13th century under the Abbasid 
caliphs. (Ostling) With such rich history come legacies for Iraq that date back to the 
pre-state-centric international system. 
In this paper, I investigate Iraq’s age old Shi’a, Sunni, and Kurd conflict and study the 
impact of foreign intervention on the competition for political representation amongst 
these three sects. I define foreign intervention as military involvement followed by 
interference in domestic affairs. My hypothesis is that foreign intervention exacerbates 
sectarian conflicts in Iraq because it brings political power to a contestable domain. I 
define sectarian conflict as disagreement with the current political representation and 
visualization of a political future as separate from the rest of the ‘nation’ of Iraq. The 
empirical indicators I use to measure exacerbation of Shi’a, Sunni, Kurd conflict include 
emergence of separate sectarian political parties and rebellions against the existing 
political order. Furthermore, I argue that the sectarian uprisings eventually die off as 
a repressive regime assumes control and coercively suppresses sectarian rebellions. 
 First, this paper discusses the significance of the Shi’a, Sunni, and Kurd conflict in 
Iraq. It then illustrates the history of conflict by explaining the emergence and internal 
logic of Shi’is, Sunnis and Kurds. It also examines the creation of Iraq in the back 
drop of post World War I British interests in the region, and relates it to Iraq’s sectar-
ian tensions. It then illustrates two cases of foreign intervention in Iraq—the British 
intervention in 1941 and the US led intervention in the 1991 Persian Gulf War. For 
both the interventions there is a life cycle that begins with a military combat and is 
followed by an exacerbation of sectarian conflict. Sectarian conflict is ensued by the 
emergence of a repressive regime. The statistical details of the life cycle vary through 
the two interventions; nevertheless, there exists a pattern. I also find that the conflicts 
between the sects are never strictly religious, but rather a blend of religious and political 
struggle. In the conclusion, I discuss the implications of my findings. Furthermore, I 
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embed the value of my research in the current dynamics of the world. Additionally, 
I identify weaknesses in the methodology of collection of the empirical data used for 
evidence and provide a critique of my own argument. In the end, I propose alternate 
methods of research on this topic. 
Iraq’s Sectarian Conflict: Does it really matter?
The Shi’a, Sunni, and Kurd issue is immensely significant for at least four reasons. 
First, it has caused political instability within Iraq, where the conflict amongst the three 
factions has marred Iraq’s political history with coups, regime overthrows, and bloody 
suppression of insurgencies. Second, the conflict holds transnational importance as 
it poses a challenge to the sovereignty of not only Iraq, but also to the sovereignty of 
neighboring states. The Iraq-Iran war, which was based on a border dispute, and lasted 
eight years (1980—1988) is an example of one such challenge to the sovereignty of 
the states in the region. Furthermore, with the Kurds in Iraq turning towards their 
fellow Kurds in Syria and Turkey and aspiring for an independent Kurdistan, and the 
Shi’is inclining towards Iran, threat to the existing territorial boundaries of the region 
still looms high. (Menon)
Third, with oil reserves of 120 billion to 200 billion barrels (11 percent of world’s 
proven reserves); Iraq ranks second only to Saudi Arabia in the world’s largest oil 
reserves. The cost of extraction of Iraq’s oil reserve is comparatively lower to other 
countries because about 40 percent of the reserves lie only 600 meters beneath earth’s 
surface. (Ward) Hence, due to Iraq’s position as a leading oil exporter, sectarian con-
flict within Iraq has always captured the attention of great powers, for example the 
involvement of Britain post World War I, and involvement of the USA and the USSR 
during the Iraq—Iran war. 
Fourth, the Shi’a, Sunni, Kurd matter is a human rights issue. Through out time 
countless innocent people have been tortured and persecuted on grounds of sect. Ac-
cording to the official Iraqi documents about 5 million (both Shi’is and Kurds) were 
executed during the Ba’ath regime. Additionally more than 10 million were imprisoned 
and tortured. (Mahdi)
Conflict: Origin and History
Iraq’s Shi’a, Sunni, Kurd issue is not recent. In fact it dates back many centuries. 
Even the creation of Iraq needs to be understood not through the lens of self-deter-
mination of the Shi’is, Sunnis and Kurds, but in the context of British interests. (Mc 
Whirter) With this outlook it is somewhat more comprehensible to grasp the tensions 
amongst sects that exist today. 
Shi’iS 
Both Shi’a and Sunni Muslims share the same belief in one God, the belief that the 
Quran is from God, and that Muhammad was the last messenger from God. Shi’is 
differ from Sunnis mainly because of their belief in the institution of Imamate. Un-
like Sunnis, who view Imams as prayer leaders only, Shi’is consider Imams as leaders 
of the Muslim community, law and authority. The Imams have religious wisdom and 
walayat (spiritual guidance) to rightfully interpret the Quran and the sharia (code of 
law derived from the Quran) and the Sunna (the teachings and practices of Muham-
mad). Shi’is believe only the Imams are infallible and therefore chosen by God to lead 
Muslims. (“The Columbian Encyclopedia”)
The word Shi'a means 'party' and refers to Shi'atu Ali or Party of Ali. The Shi'a 
sect originated after a dispute regarding the succession of Muhammad after his death 
in 632 AD. Shi’a Muslims argued that legitimate succession lied in the lineage of 
Muhammad, and hence Ali, cousin and son-in-law of Muhammad, was the rightful 
heir to the caliphate (caliph—short form of vicegerent of the messenger of God and 
the commander of the faithful—is a representative of God on earth and a civil and 
religious leader of the Muslims). Shi’is see the appointment of the three caliphs (Abu 
Bakr, Umar, and Uthman) preceding Ali as a conspiracy and a grave mistake. Tradi-
tionally Shi’is deem Ali—the fourth caliph to succeed Muhammad—and his eleven 
descendants, beginning with his sons Hasan and Hussein, as the Imams of Islam. Ad-
ditionally, they believe that the twelfth Imam ascended to heavens in a supernatural 
form and will return to earth on the Day of Judgment as Mahdi or Messiah. (“The 
Columbian Encyclopedia”)
Ali assumed caliphate in 656 AD after the assassination of the third caliph—Uth-
man. During his caliphate, Uthman had bestowed governorships of the important 
states to his kinsmen to strengthen the Muslim empire. Upon attaining caliphate, Ali 
dismissed these governors and subsequently experienced their rebellion. Most notable 
of these rebellions was that of Muawwiya (cousin of Uthman and governor of Syria), 
who waged wars against Ali in the name of vengeance for Uthman’s blood. Those 
that fought alongside Ali in these wars later identified themselves as Shi’is. (“The 
Columbian Encyclopedia”)
The emergence and consolidation of the Shi’is accelerated after the assassination of 
Ali in 661 AD by the Kharjites (originally supporters of Shi’is, who later accused Ali 
to have betrayed his God-given legacy for not waging war against Abu Bakr when he 
became the first caliph of Islam). The martyrdom of Hussein by the son of Muawwiya 
in Karbala in 680AD further united the Shi’is, who still mourn the event as inspiration 
to rise against oppression. 
Ali is the only Shi’i Imam to have assumed leadership of Muslims. Throughout 
history, the Sunni rulers have been wary of the institution of Imamate and Shi’is have 
experienced persecution and oppression during the Umayyad dynasty (661—750AD), 
Abbasid dynasty (758—1258AD) and the Wahhabi movement (since the 18th century). 
(“The Columbian Encyclopedia”)
Besides persecution, Shi’is have also experienced hindrances in freely practicing their 
faith. For example a prominent Shi’a practice is pilgrimage to the tombs of their twelve 
Imams. Six of the twelve Imams’ (first, third, seventh, ninth, tenth, and twelfth) tombs 
are in Iraq. Furthermore, Najaf, Karbala, Kazimayn, and Samarra—the four most 
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sacred Shi’i shrine cities—are in Iraq. (Gray) Before the Iraq Iran War (1980—1988), 
during which Iranians aimed to recover the holy cities from Iraq, thousands of Shi’a 
pilgrims used to come to Iraq during Shi’is holy month of Muharram in the Islamic 
calendar. Under Saddam Hussein’s regime Shi’is were restrained from freely practicing 
many of their rituals. (“The Columbian Encyclopedia”)
Today, Shi'is comprise ten to fifteen percent of world's Muslim population. And ac-
cording to the World Factbook, Shi’is form the majority of total population in Iran (89 
percent), Bahrain (70 percent), and Iraq (58—63 percent). Hence, the Shi’a issues in 
Iraq transcend to neighboring states of Iran and Bahrain. (“The World Factbook”)
sunnis
 Before the death of Muhammad (632 AD) all Muslims were Sunnis. The word 
Sunni derives from Sunnah which means the practice and conduct of Muhammad. 
Sunnis also attach the meaning of “a middle path” to the word Sunni implying the more 
moderate position of Sunnis between the extremes of Shi’is and Kharjites. (Pike) 
A majority of Sunnis consider Shi’is as Muslims, except for the three Sunni schools 
of thought in South Asia—the Berailvi, the Deobandi and the Wahhabi—that consider 
Shi’is to be apostates from Islam. Sunnis hold Ali in high esteem, but unlike Shi’is do 
not see the necessity of lineage of Muhammad for legitimate leadership of Muslims. 
According to Sunnis, the only criterion for legitimate authority is capable leadership 
skills, obedience to Islam and consent of the majority. Hence, the Sunni sphere of 
governance is not in the hands of religious leaders only. During the Umayyad and 
Abbasid dynasties and later on in the Ottoman Empire, it was the absence of cleri-
cal hierarchies and centralized institutions that provided greater adaptability to local 
conditions while expanding into non-Muslim territories. (Pike) 
To better understand the current Shi’a Sunni relations within Iraq and also between 
Iraq and Iran it is essential to trace back the conflict between the Safavid Empire 
(1501—1732) based in Iran and the Ottoman Turks. The Safavids, with their militant 
theology to spread Shi’ism through the force of arms and claim to descent from Shi’a 
Islam's Seventh Imam, were the first to declare Shi’a Islam as their official religion. 
Due to the presence of the Shi’a holy cities, such as Karbala and Najaf, the Safavids 
aspired to attain control of Iraq. On the other hand, the Ottomans wanted Iraq for two 
reasons—first Iraq held great symbolic value for Muslims all over the world because it 
had been the capital of the Islamic civilization for five centuries under the Abbasids, 
and second, the Ottomans wanted to maintain Iraq under Sunni control to provide a 
bulwark against the spread of Shi’a Islam to Asia Minor. The result was a prolonged 
conflict between the Safavids and Ottomans that widened the Shi’a—Sunni gulf. The 
wars were marked by brief periods of control by each side during which the opposite 
faction was suppressed and persecuted. (“Country Study…”)
With the decline of the Safavids in early 18th century due to economic problems, 
political corruption and uprisings due to the coercive conversion of Sunni Muslims to 
Shi’ism, the Ottomans gained control of Iraq. Under the Ottomans, Sunnis flourished 
and gained administrative and political privileges. This resulted in the Shi’a—Sunni 
class cleavage. The landowner and business class comprised mainly of Sunnis and the 
Shi’is increasingly constituted the poor working class. (“Country Study…”)
It was not until the weakening of the Ottoman Empire coupled with the interven-
tion of the Western powers—primarily Britain—that the ideology of nationalism 
spread and the Shi’is and Kurds began to demand proper political representation in 
Iraq. However, after centuries of Ottoman rule, Iraq was not ready for a nation-state 
and after its independence in 1932, the country struggled to remain free of political 
instability in a backdrop of three competitors for political power—Shi’is, Sunnis and 
Kurds. (“Country Study…”) It is noteworthy to recognize that the British intervention 
parallels very closely to the US intervention today that aims to spread the institution 
of democracy in the region. 
The Shi'a-Sunni conflict over political power that intensified during the Ottoman-
Safavid wars has transcended across decades and is extremely significant in the current 
state centric international system as it holds implications not only for the state of Iraq 
but also for neighboring states. (Menon)
kuRds
Often overshadowed by the Shi’a—Sunni conflict, the third largest ethnic group 
in the Middle East after the Arabs and the Turks are the nation of stateless people, 
the Kurds. Kurds were traditionally nomadic herders of Indo-European origin that 
inhabited the plateau and mountain area in south west Asia—including parts of east 
Turkey, northeast Iraq, and northwest Iran—before 3100 BC and through 1000 BC. 
After World War I, Kurds have been divided amongst Turkey, Iraq, Iran, and Syria. 
Today, about half of the world’s Kurdish population lives in Turkey. Additionally, Kurds 
account for about 15-20 percent of Iraq’s population living mostly in Dahuk (Dohuk), 
Mosul, Erbil, Kirkuk, and Sulaimaniyah.   (“The Columbian Encyclopedia”)
After being conquered by the Arabs in seventh century, the Kurds converted to 
Islam and despite being ethnically closest to Iranians, majority of the Kurds are Sunni 
Muslims. Some Kurds are Yazidis (inhabiting mostly Mosul, Iraq) that believe the devil 
rules the world. Yazidis are despised and referred to as ‘devil worshippers’ by both Sunni 
and Shi’a Muslims. (“The Columbian Encyclopedia”) Moreover, Kurds have a long 
history of foreign occupation. They were ruled by Seljuk Turks in the 11th century, by 
Mongols from 13th—15th century, by the Safavid Empire in the 16th century and by 
the Ottoman Empire from 17th—early 20th century. (“Country Study…”) Under the 
Ottomans (especially between 1915—1918), Kurds (in particular journalists, intel-
lectuals and human rights activists) were massively persecuted, and coerced to assimi-
late within Turkey through banning of Kurdish language and resettlement of Kurds 
in non-Kurdish areas of Turkey. (Vosbigian)Hence, after the defeat of Ottomans in 
World War I, Kurds demanded independence in the Paris Peace Conference in 1919. 
In 1920 under the Treaty of Sèvres, Kurds were promised an independent Kurdish 
state. However, after the ascension of Mustafa Kemal Pasha (later known as Ataturk) 
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in Turkey, Treaty of Lausanne was signed in 1923, which excluded the formation 
of an independent Kurdish state. Any revolts by Kurds were coercively suppressed. 
(“Country Study…”)
Kurds even today hope for an autonomous state and these hopes become overt with 
change of regime in the region, as in 1958 when the Ba’athist government replaced the 
Iraqi monarchy. (Bruner) Unfortunately, the Kurds have only seen broken promises 
of independence thus far.
Iraq: Nation-State?
To better understand the sectarian conflicts that have marked the history of present 
day Iraq, it is essential to recognize that the boundaries of Iraq were carved out not 
by the nation of Iraq, but by the British Empire. (Mc Whirter) Iraq was created after 
the defeat of the Ottomans in the First World War and the subsequent liquidation of 
the Ottoman Empire. 
Before World War I, British influence in the Ottoman provinces of Basra, Baghdad, 
and Mosul was mainly limited to economic activities. However, with the emergence 
of Russia and Germany as a challenge to British influence in Mesopotamia, Britain 
invaded the region at the outbreak of World War I to secure land route to India. After 
significant effort, Britain seized control of Mesopotamia. (Haj, p. 27) When World 
War I ended, the League of Nations allocated mandates for control of Middle Eastern 
territories to Britain and France. Under the mandate, Britain demarcated boundaries 
based on British interests, which included political and economic control of the region. 
(Eisenstadt and Mathewson, p. 82)
The people of Iraq did not accept Britain as a legitimate authority and as a result 
rebellions arose through out the region. To counter the extreme resistance from all 
factions in Iraq, the British granted the Iraq’s high class Sunnis power in return of 
submission and cooperation. Furthermore, much to the opposition of Shi’is and Kurds, 
the British stroke an agreement with the non-Iraqi, but Muslim Faisal I who was a 
member of Arabian Peninsula’s Sunni royal family. (Mc Whirter) Under the agreement 
he would be appointed King of Iraq as long as Britain retained mandate of the region. 
Faisal I was crowned king under a constitutional monarchy, which was superficially 
democratic, but inherently under British control. During the monarchy of Faisal I, 
Britain developed military bases, corporations (in particular oil corporations), and a 
privileged trading status in Iraq. (Mc Whirter) Britain also continued to control Iraq’s 
political and economic matters. Once a pro-British government was firmly established 
in Iraq, the British mandate was no longer needed and Iraq was granted ‘independence’ 
in 1932. (Mc Whirter) However, even after independence Britain continued to exert 
influence on Iraq and meddle heavily in its affairs. The Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1930 
retained British involvement in Mosul and Kirkuk oilfields and maintained British air 
bases near Baghdad and Basra. Furthermore, Britain still held the right to maneuver 
troops through Iraq. This infringement on Iraq’s sovereignty gave rise to three major 
nationalist oppositional groups—the Nationalist Democrats, the Ba’ath, and the Iraqi 
communists. (p. 82, Haj) 
 It is important to view the prolonged political unrest and sectarian struggle in Iraq 
by keeping in perspective the aforementioned historical background of the creation 
of Iraq and its subsequent independence. Moreover, we must ask the question: Is Iraq 
really a nation state? 
Foreign Intervention
In this section I will examine two cases of foreign intervention in Iraq—the Brit-
ish intervention in 1941 and the US led coalition against Iraq in 1990-1991 Persian 
Gulf War. Each intervention exhibits a life cycle. The first stage of this cycle comprises 
of military struggle between Iraqi and foreign troops. The second stage begins with 
termination of military action between the two sides. During this stage, a regime lack-
ing legitimate authority attempts to enforce its power. Absence of legitimate authority 
initiates the third stage of the cycle, which is marked by exacerbation of the Shi’a, 
Sunni, and Kurd conflict, as each sect struggles to assert its political space. 
In the first case study, the life cycle of British intervention ended with the overthrow 
of the repressive monarchy in 1958. In the second case study the life cycle ends with 
a Saddam Hussein’s repressive regime regaining power. Both regimes faced intense 
rebellions and were overthrown subsequently.
 1941—1958: Britain Intervention in Iraq
After 1939, the political space of Iraq entered a phase of conspiracies, coups, counter 
coups and rebellions. King Faisal I died in 1933, and was succeeded by his son Ghazi. 
However, King Ghazi died in a mysterious automobile accident in 1939. Because 
Ghazi’s son was only three years old at the time, Prince Abd al-Illah was appointed as 
a regent. It was in this context that the 1941 anti-British military coup occurred and 
brought the pro-Axis Rashid Ali in power. With the twin support of Germans and the 
Vichy French government in Syria, Prime Minister Rashid Ali besieged the British air 
base of Habbaniya—a clear abrogation of the Anglo-Iraqi treaty of 1930. Owing to 
the threat of losing other military bases and control of oil reserves, Britain invaded Iraq 
in 1941. Britain justified the invasion by accusing Rashid Ali of violating the terms of 
Anglo-Iraqi treaty. This was the beginning of the first stage of the life cycle of foreign 
intervention—military combat between British and Iraqi troops. (Mills)
The first stage of foreign intervention was relatively short as Britain defeated the 
technologically backward Iraqi forces with ease. The Germans that were preoccupied 
with campaigns in Crete never sent aid to the Iraqi troops that was simultaneously 
adequate and timely. (Mills) Following Iraq’s defeat, Britain forcefully re-imposed Prince 
Abd al Ilah as regent of Iraq. Thus began the second stage of the foreign intervention 
cycle. The re-imposition of monarchy lacked legitimacy and instigated grave resent-
ment against the British and the monarchy. The successive governments of Nuri as Said 
(1941-44) and Hamdi al Pachachi (1944-46) were also pro-British and lacked proper 
authority. (Mills) It was in this authority vacuum that the Shi’is, Sunnis and Kurds 
began to assert their political space. This marked the beginning of the third stage of 
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the cycle of intervention where sectarian conflict exacerbates through the emergence 
of separate political parties. 
In the aftermath of the Second World War, the British pulled out of Iraq and the 
sectarian conflict assumed a much more distinct political cleavage. The Sunnis joined 
the Ba’ath party, which was a blend of Arab nationalism and socialist values. (Mills) 
The Shi’is increasingly joined the Iraqi Communist Party (ICP). Yitzhak Nakash 
explains the Iraqi Communist Party in the following words:
Indeed, the massive adherence of young Shi’is to the ICP did not reflect so 
much their propensity to communism, as it did their search for political par-
ticipation and social influence, and their attempt to bring about a new political 
order in Iraq. The appeal of communism to the Shi’is was closely related to the 
failure of Pan Arabism to act as a unifying framework in Iraq. (Nakash, p.133) 
Nakash’s explanation of the ICP supports my argument of exacerbation of sectar-
ian conflict since I define sectarian conflict as disagreement with the current political 
representation and visualization of a political future as separate from the rest of the 
‘nation’ of Iraq.
 Meanwhile, inspired by the Kurdish Democratic Party in Iran, the Kurdish Demo-
cratic Party of Iraq was formed in 1945. The Kurdish Democratic Party demanded self 
rule of Kurds within Iraq, but in the 1950s began to assert the need for joint Kurdish 
cooperation across boundaries. Hence, in 1953 the name of the party changed to the 
Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iraq (Ghareeb, p.35).
The three political parties struggled to assert a dominant political space. And in 
1958 the monarchy was overthrown through the ICP assisted military coup in the 
back drop of growing antagonism against the pro-British monarchy. This marked the 
end of British intervention in Iraq. The royal family was executed and Brigadier Abdel 
Karim Kassem took control of Iraq. (Mc Whirter) 
US led Intervention in Iraq: The Second Persian Gulf War—1991 
Iraq invaded Kuwait in August 1990. There are three causes that are usually identified 
for this invasion. First, since Iraq’s inception, it has laid claims on Kuwait. The validity 
of Iraq’s claim is beyond the scope of my paper. Second, Kuwait holds economic value 
due to its high quality oil resources. And third, in the aftermath of the Iraq—Iran war 
(1980—1988), Iraq owed huge debts to Middle Eastern countries including Kuwait 
and Saudi Arabia. (Menon)
US along with other members of the United Nations demanded withdrawal of 
Iraqi forces. However, after Iraq’s failure to comply, on January 16, 1991, US led al-
lied forces (that included troops from other UN member states) invaded Iraq and her 
occupation in Kuwait. This marked the first stage of the foreign intervention life cycle. 
Iraqi forces were defeated with relative ease and on February 27th 1991 a ceasefire was 
ordered by President Bush. (Menon) This was the beginning of the second stage of 
the foreign intervention life cycle. 
After termination of military combat, began the third stage of the 1991 foreign 
intervention—sectarian conflict emerged with both Shi’a and Kurd insurgencies. The 
Shi’a insurgency was engineered by the Tehran based insurgent leadership group—the 
Supreme Council of the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI). The SCIRI delivered 
several thousand soldiers from Iran to support the Shi’a uprising in Iraq. The SCIRI 
aimed to take advantage of the authority vacuum in Iraq created by the Gulf War. It 
further aimed to gain support of the population and army of Iraq to bring about an 
armed revolt. (Cline)
The major uprising began in Basra in March 1991 and rapidly diffused to other 
towns. Within a few days the insurgents established control of over twelve towns in 
southern Iraq. Saddam Hussein sent Republican Guard units to suppress the Shi’a 
uprisings. Insurgents were arrested or brutally killed and eventually all the insurgent 
held towns were retaken by Saddam’s regime. Since the terms of the cease fire had 
established “no-fly zones” in northern and southern Iraq, use of airplanes to suppress 
the Shi’a insurgents was prohibited. Hence, the Iraqi officials used helicopters. As 
the Shi’a uprising was suppressed in the south it emerged in the Kurdish north. Both 
the Shi’is and the Ba’ath party officials committed brutal atrocities to undermine the 
other. The Shi’is indiscriminately killed Ba’ath officials and their families and rela-
tives. The government forces retaliated with equal if not greater coercion. Insurgents 
were arrested, tortured and massively persecuted. (Cline) The statistical figures on 
the insurgents considerably differ. It has been reported that around Karbala there 
were 50,000 insurgents. (Khadduri and Ghareeb, p. 194) The statistical records on 
fatalities don’t fall in agreement either. It has been estimated that 50,000 to 60,000 
had been killed. (Cline)
This uprising was a significant indicator of the Shi’a envisioning their identity as 
separate from other sects in Iraq. The Shi’is strictly demanded isolated Shi’a rule. In 
fact the driving slogan of the uprising was "Jafari (Shi’a) Rule." The uprising also 
indicates the Iraqi Shi’is ties with the Shi’is of Iran. (Cline) 
In late March 1991, the Kurds began to assert their political space in Iraq by rebel-
lion. It is reported that the CIA engineered the rebellion. However, after the onset of 
insurgencies, the Kurds were not provided the support they had been promised by 
the U.N. coalition forces. Government troops brutally suppressed the rebellion by 
massacring thousands of Kurds. This created a huge exodus of Kurds to neighboring 
states and it is estimated that one to two million Kurds migrated Turkey and Iran. 
(Iraq: History) The U.N. coalition forces eventually declared a “no fly zone” in north-
ern Iraq for the protection of the Kurds remaining in the region. The Kurds gained 
control of a 15,000-square-mile autonomous region in northern Iraq populated by 3 
million Kurds. (Bruner) The Kurdish uprising of 1991 signifies the Kurdish vision for 
autonomy in Iraq. This uprising also shows the Kurdish political and national identity 
as separate from other sects in Iraq. 
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Conclusion
 The two case studies reveal a life cycle for both interventions where there is military 
combat followed by an exacerbation of sectarian conflict, which is further ensued by 
the emergence of a repressive regime. It is important to recognize that in the two case 
studies the conflicts between the three sects are never strictly religious or ethnic. In 
fact, the conflict is primarily over lack of political representation, which is often glob-
ally misperceived as also a conflict of sectarian and religious hatred. It is the political 
nature of the sectarian conflict that justifies its augmentation after foreign intervention. 
Foreign interventions create authority vacuums which allow different sects to assert 
their political space in Iraq. 
One could argue that sectarian exacerbation does not occur due to foreign inter-
vention solely because foreign intervention simply makes the empirical indicators for 
sectarian conflicts more easily available for data collection. Is it reasonable to assume 
that a repressive leader like Saddam Hussein would actually rally on sectarian dissent 
that would foment further sectarian conflicts? An alternate method of falsifying, or 
proving, the null hypothesis would be to conduct ethnographic onsite research. A 
challenge with ethnographic onsite research will be the necessity to conduct it over 
several foreign interventions. Maybe a practical alternate is collaboration of academic 
research and on-field journalists in Iraq. 
So what does the foreign intervention life cycle imply? The life cycle predicts that 
sectarian conflicts subside as a regime asserts its rule. Bearing in mind the impact of 
the Shi’a association with Iran and the Kurds demand for Kurdistan, such a life cycle 
predicts sustenance of the current boundaries of Iraq. It further questions the validity 
and effectiveness of the current US intervention in Iraq. If military involvement is 
known to destabilize the politics of the region, then is spread of education in the masses 
and development of the country a better way to build democracy in Iraq?
 Furthermore, important questions arise if the implications of my research are em-
bedded in the fast-changing world dynamics due to globalization. How many times 
will the cycles of foreign intervention, followed by sectarian conflicts and repressive 
regimes repeat themselves in Iraq? Will the Shi’is and Kurds challenge the British 
carved boundaries of Iraq and change the current map of the world? Will the Kurds 
eventually get their claimed homeland, Kurdistan, as promised in 1920 in the Treaty 
of Sevres? What are the implications of the spread of democracy in the region, keeping 
in mind the Shi’a beliefs on the rights of political representation of Muslims? How 
will the definition of democracy have to be re-defined if Shi’is assume power in Iraq, 
and do foreigners recognize this dilemma? 
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Disney’s Pirates as 
Anti-Piracy: Promoting 
Family Values and Morals 
Through an Unlikely Group 
of Villains and Knaves 
By wendy deAcon
When we think of pirates, we tend to imagine a group of unruly men plundering 
and looting seaports and towns, leaving destruction and death in their wake. Such is 
the reality of piracy: pirates were motivated by greed, lust, and a desire for freedom 
from conventional society and order. It is with surprise, then, that we find pirates as 
a focal point in the films and works of a company that is primarily concerned with 
instilling family values and maintaining innocence in an increasingly corrupt society. 
The Disney Company, through modifications of classic stories and alterations of 
history, has managed to portray pirates in opposition to traditional piracy. These por-
trayals undergo a process of “Disneyfication,” which is “the application of simplified 
aesthetic, intellectual, or moral standards to a thing that has the potential for more 
complex or thought-provoking expression” (Shortsleeve 1). However, Disney’s pirates 
are not merely simplified. They are altered to fit a particular mold so that much of the 
historical truth of piracy is lost in the end result. Disney is able to get away with such 
a “Disneyfication” of history because our society desires it. Historical pirates—law-
less men driven by greed and self-interest—were outside of society and opposed to 
our values. Rather than accept their marginality as historical fact, we desire instead 
to overlook the debauchery in their acts and find a way to connect them with one 
of our most important values: the family. In so doing, we are pulling them into our 
conventional structures of society and disregarding the qualities that set them apart as 
objectionable outcasts. Disney’s most recent portrayals of pirates exhibit strong con-
nections to the family, which, I argue, is what makes them acceptable to our society. 
However, if we look at earlier depictions of pirates in Disney, we cannot find such 
explicit connections to the family. Why would portrayals of piracy be more problem-
atic today than fifty years ago? Has our society become so much more conservative or 
concerned with family values that such “Disneyfication” of history is required—or, 
conversely, have we become non-conservative to the extent that Disney is altering 
history in order to reaffirm traditional morals and values that have recently been in 
decline? Since the 1950s, when Disney first used pirates in films, we have become less 
conservative and likewise less concerned with values that were inherent in our society 
at that time. Disney’s portrayals of pirates exhibit a change over time that emphasizes 
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